Improving Minuteman III Maintenance Concepts by Crouch, Daniel W.
Air Force Institute of Technology
AFIT Scholar
Theses and Dissertations Student Graduate Works
3-23-2017
Improving Minuteman III Maintenance Concepts
Daniel W. Crouch
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd
Part of the Operations and Supply Chain Management Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more information, please contact richard.mansfield@afit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Crouch, Daniel W., "Improving Minuteman III Maintenance Concepts" (2017). Theses and Dissertations. 792.
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/792
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMPROVING MINUTEMAN III MAINTENANCE CONCEPTS 
 
 
THESIS 
 
 
Daniel W. Crouch, Captain, USAF 
 
AFIT-ENS-MS-17-M-122 
 
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 
AIR UNIVERSITY 
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio 
 
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. 
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the United 
States Government.  This material is declared a work of the U.S. Government and is not 
subject to copyright protection in the United States.
AFIT-ENS-MS-17-M-122 
IMPROVING MINUTEMAN III MAINTENANCE CONCEPTS 
THESIS 
Presented to the Faculty 
Department of Operational Sciences 
Graduate School of Engineering and Management 
Air Force Institute of Technology 
Air University 
Air Education and Training Command 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
Degree of Master of Science in Logistics and Supply Chain Management 
Daniel W. Crouch, MS 
Captain, USAF 
March 2017 
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. 
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED. 
 
AFIT-ENS-MS-17-M-122 
 
IMPROVING MINUTEMAN III MAINTENANCE CONCEPTS 
 
 
 
 
Daniel W. Crouch, MS 
Captain, USAF 
 
Committee Membership: 
 
Dr. Paul L. Hartman, PhD 
Chair 
 
Dr. Carl R. Parson, PhD 
Member 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
AFIT-ENS-MS-17-M-122 
 
Abstract 
Since the end of the Cold War, the Air Force has sought out efficiencies across 
multiple processes to transform into a cost-effective force.  However, processes 
applicable to the Minuteman III (MM III) weapon system have only recently seen efforts 
to increase effectiveness.  The purpose of this research is to investigate whether the use of 
third generation maintenance concepts could benefit the sustainment of the MM III 
through its planned retirement around 2030.  Primary and secondary sources outlining the 
history of the strategic missile force and its current state were collected.  Themes from 
each era were analyzed using Prospect Theory as a means to understand the past and 
interpret the current state.  The resulting interpretation led to propositions on how third 
generation maintenance concepts could be applied to the sustainment of the MM III as 
well as benefit its planned replacement, the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBDS) 
program. 
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IMPROVING MINUTEMAN III MAINTENANCE CONCEPTS 
 
I.  Introduction 
Background 
 The Minuteman III (MM III) Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) system 
has been existence since the 1970s and, in some cases, the infrastructure buried below 
ground has been retrofitted from old Minuteman I facilities which date back to the 1960s.  
As a system with strategic importance to the deterrence policy of the United States, the 
reliability of each weapon and its associated infrastructure is critical (Phillips, Rehmert, 
Waller, Bergdolt, & Walston, 2011).  Additionally, the MM III is expected to provide 
strategic deterrence through at least 2030 when its replacement, the GBSD (Ground 
Based Strategic Deterrence), is projected to become operational (Woolf, 2015).  With the 
increasing age of the MM III and the GBSD’s expected lifespan of at least 50 years, the 
ability for maintenance personnel to adequately sustain this deterrence force has strategic 
implications for the United States foreign policy.   
However, since the end of the Cold War, the nuclear enterprise as a whole has 
degraded due to lack of oversight, funding, and modernization.  The Honorable Frank 
Kendall, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, stated 
in a 2014 speech to the Air Force Association Conference and Exposition that: 
…it has become clear to Secretary Hagel and DOD’s senior leadership that a 
consistent lack of investment and support for our nuclear forces for far too many 
years has left us with little margin to cope with mounting stresses…For too long, 
our leaders have not [done] enough to support the missileers and the others 
involved in this enterprise - overlooking career paths, compensation, decaying 
infrastructure, and small unit leadership that are mission-critical (Kendall, 2014). 
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 Because of this lack of investment in infrastructure and modernization throughout 
the nuclear triad, many systems, including the MM III, have outlived their original 
service life and are in need of an updated replacement (Woolf, 2015).  Though the United 
States made a commitment in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review to work towards a world 
without nuclear weapons and to deemphasize their use in the national security strategy, 
the focus must be on maintain a safe, secure, and effective force until such weapons are 
removed from the arsenal (Department of Defense, 2010).   Admiral Cecil D. Haney, the 
former Commander of United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), reiterated 
this sentiment in testimony before the Senate Committed on Armed Services on 19 
March 2015, stating that: 
The likelihood of major conflict with other nuclear powers is remote today, and 
the ultimate U.S. goal remains the achievement of a world without nuclear 
weapons.  Until that day comes, the U.S. requires a safe, secure, and effective 
nuclear deterrent force, even as it continues to reduce its nuclear stockpile and the 
number of deployed nuclear warheads.  (Haney, 2015) 
Admiral Haney continued by stating:  
 We must commit to investments that will allow us to maintain this infrastructure 
in a safe and secure way for as long as nuclear weapons exist, or risk degrading 
the deterrent and stabilizing effect of a credible and capable nuclear force.  Today 
we spend less than 3 percent of the DOD budget on nuclear capabilities.  As 
stated by the Congressional Budget Office, recapitalization investments that are 
necessary to ensure safety and security will increase this number to “roughly 5 to 
6 percent.”  (Haney, 2015) 
Significant nuclear weapon system modernization is already underway to produce 
a new ballistic missile submarine, a stealth bomber force, and a replacement ICBM.  
Additionally, there are significant acquisition efforts within the Air Force for other 
weapon systems such as the F-35, the KC-46, and the T-X.  With these high-cost 
acquisition programs, the fight for dollars to fulfill all requirements is strained (Mehta, 
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2016a).  Additionally, the maintenance costs of legacy weapon systems (such as the F-
16) until their modernized counterparts (e.g. the F-35) are operational has been shown to 
be increasing, thus increasing the stress on the DOD’s budget (Versprille, 2016).  This 
statement is also true for the MM III, as depicted in Figure 1, which indicates that 
Operations and Maintenance (O&M) costs have nearly doubled between 1996 and 2016 
(AFTOC, 2017).  
 
Figure 1.  MM III O&M and Personnel Costs  
The maintenance policy governing ICBM sustainment has highly favored a run-
to-failure model where the performed maintenance is in reaction to a system breaking.  
Because of the lack of modernization coupled with aging infrastructure, the maintenance 
and sustainment communities have experienced increased difficulty in ensuring the high 
levels of reliability demanded by the strategic posture of the United States under such a 
policy.  Thus, this research will explore a modernized maintenance policy utilizing 
Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM), and Condition-Based Maintenance (CBM) as 
an option to aid in extending the life of the MM III.  Additionally, by incorporating these 
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techniques prior to the deployment of the GBSD, lessons learned and best practices can 
be applied to the future system.  
Problem Statement 
The problem facing the ICBM sustainment community is that the maintenance 
policy currently utilized in support of the MM III is reactive in nature and does not 
leverage technology to detect/predict failure.  Thus, RCM and CBM concepts are applied 
to the ICBM construct in order to answer the question of how these principles may be 
implemented to develop a preventative maintenance policy rather than a reactive policy. 
Research Questions 
1.  Can MM III sustainment managers leverage RCM methods to provide the 
required level of readiness at an appropriate cost?   
2.  Can existing CBM technologies can be applied to the MM III and GBSD in 
order to effectively sustain the weapon systems?  
Research Focus 
The scope of this research concentrates on a holistic view of the weapon system 
due to the complexity and magnitude of components that make up the entire MM III 
system.  Additionally, this research is not intended to determine specific reliability levels 
nor to surmise what technologies should be leveraged.  Instead, the focus of this research 
will center around whether or not RCM and CBM are viable solutions to pursue in order 
to improve MM III sustainment.  
 The GBSD is not considered to be a primary focus of this research.  This is 
because the components that will make up this new weapon system are still in the 
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conceptual phase of development.  However, because the GBSD acquisition program is 
considered to be a recapitalization of the existing infrastructure, the GBSD must be 
included in this research.   
Methodology 
This research utilizes the case study method as a means to investigate the situation 
surrounding ICBM sustainment to answer the research questions listed above.  To answer 
the research questions listed earlier, a comprehensive history of policies and actions 
regarding the ICBM community is compiled using sources such as policy documents, 
senior leader statements, and cost data.  Such a compilation attempts to incorporate 
policies, procedures, personnel and systems information into a balanced historical view 
from the beginning of the nuclear enterprise through 1992.  Doing so allows the 
researchers to analyze that information through a theoretical lens in order to reduce bias 
within the research.   
After doing so, the same nature of information is gathered for the current state of 
the ICBM community from 1992 through the present day.  This compiled information 
concerning the current state is also viewed through an appropriate theoretical lens to 
develop a group of expectations for the current and future state of the ICBM community.  
From this, the researchers utilize these expectations, as projected through theory, to 
determine if there is support for the research questions and to develop any 
recommendations based on that determination. 
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Assumptions/Limitations 
Discussion regarding the nuclear enterprise and the future of defense spending for 
a nuclear deterrent force is currently abundant.  As such, the current state of policies and 
funding regarding the nuclear enterprise in general and the MM III weapon system 
specifically is a constantly changing target.  Therefore, a limitation of this research is that 
while it attempts to obtain a comprehensive view of the current state, recent events may 
not be entirely captured.  As such, swift changes in the political landscape could result in 
differing outcomes when a theoretical perspective is applied.   
The ability for maintenance tasks to be performed on a weapon system depends 
heavily on the ability of the supply chain network to be able to provide the required 
components at the correct time.  Additionally, trained and qualified maintenance 
personnel are needed to perform the task required.  While inherently linked, the research 
did not investigate the ability for the supply chain to adapt to a change in maintenance 
policy nor other resource requirements such as personnel.   
Lastly, much of this research requires secondary sources that interpret the nuclear 
enterprise, ICBM sustainment, and other topics related to this thesis.  Though primary 
sources such as technical orders, Air Force Instructions, and policy documents were 
preferred, secondary sources were used to fill in gaps in the research.  As such, the 
assumption is made that these secondary sources were accurate and limited in their 
potential bias.  
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Implications 
The MM III sustainment community is a vast and complex system of personnel, 
policies, and procedures.  Additionally, it involves a diverse group of roles and 
responsibilities that touch multiple functional areas of a bureaucratic system intended to 
allow for progress but limit organizational agitation produced by frequent radical 
changes.  This research intends to determine if a shift in the fundamental maintenance 
policies governing MM III sustainment could benefit the nuclear enterprise and nuclear 
deterrence.  Implications of such a determination would span the entire sustainment 
community and could even affect the operational community and deterrence policies.  
However, even rejection of the research questions would be able to provide the ICBM 
community with beneficial information as they progress through the acquisition of the 
GBSD and the retirement of the MM III.  
Summary 
This chapter emphasizes the issue of aging infrastructure and the costs associated 
with sustaining legacy systems as well as modernization within the nuclear enterprise.  It 
also outlines the scope of the research and the associated research questions while stating 
the assumptions, limitations, and possible implications.  Chapter II explores the historical 
nature of the nuclear enterprise, the decline in focus on nuclear matters and the 
subsequent re-emphasis on nuclear policy.  Additionally, it presents the relevant literature 
on RCM, CBM, and current MM III maintenance policies.  Lastly, it investigates 
Prospect Theory as a tool to interpret the relevant literature.  Chapter III discusses the 
specific methodology performed during this research.  Chapter IV presents the results and 
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findings while Chapter V summarizes the research and provides additional areas for 
research. 
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II. Literature Review 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter reviews literature relevant to the research questions with respect to 
the ICBM community as well as RCM and CBM.  First, a description of the MM III 
weapon system is portrayed in order for the reader to gain a basic technical 
understanding.  Next, a historical review of the ICBM force will explore the decline and 
subsequent revival of focus on the nuclear enterprise.  By doing so, one can attempt to 
better understand the current state of the ICBM sustainment community and its associated 
maintenance practices.  Additional research will focus on recent studies that were 
intended to increase the efficiency of operations within the ICBM force.  This chapter 
also reviews the principles of RCM and CBM and their effect on maintenance policies.  
This framework is essential to understanding the principles explored later in this research.  
Lastly, this chapter explores Prospect Theory as a tool to be used throughout this 
research. 
MM III Physical Description 
The silo-launched ICBM has been a mainstay of the United States’ strategic 
deterrence policy since the early 1960s when the first Minuteman I missiles were placed 
on alert.  The current system employed by the Air Force, the MM III, is comprised of two 
main facilities that house the majority of systems and components that make up the 
weapon system.  The first is the Launch Facility (LF) which is an unmanned silo and 
associated equipment that is used to house and launch the LGM-30 missile and its 
payload.  A vertical launch tube, a Launcher Support Building (LSB), and Launcher 
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Equipment Room (LER) are the three main areas that comprise the LF and are all buried 
underground.  The LSB and LER contain power, environmental control, and 
communication systems critical to the operation and launch of the missile within the 
launch tube. 
The second facility is the Missile Alert Facility (MAF) which is a manned 
building housing missileers who monitor weapon system status and, if directed by the 
president, can execute a missile launch.  Depending on the design, some MAFs house 
both the building containing the missileers (known as the Launch Control Capsule 
(LCC)) and the associated support and launch equipment (known as the Launch Control 
Equipment Building (LCEB)), underground.  However, older designs have much of the 
equipment found in the LCEB above ground in what is known as the Launch Control 
Support Building (LCSB).   
Conceptually, these facilities and the equipment contained within them are very 
similar to most any other facility found throughout the Air Force.  Each facility contains 
structural aspects such as walls and support columns, power systems that ensure the 
ability to operate, HVAC systems which ensure the proper environmental controls for 
both the missileers and the missile itself, and there are redundant communication systems 
that ensure connectivity for launch orders.  Additionally, there are overlaid security 
systems to monitor and detect threats due to the sensitive nature of the weapon system.  
However, because much of the facilities and their associated equipment are underground, 
there are unique issues facing the sustainment and maintainability of the weapon system 
outside of the normal wear out facing similar systems.  Colonel Jeff Frankhouser, a 
former ICBM maintenance group commander, stated “Take a 40-year-old home, now 
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bury it in the ground.  Then figure out what your challenges are. We’ll have those” 
(Pappalardo, 2011). 
Another challenge facing the maintenance personnel supporting the MM III is that 
the MAFs and LFs are geographically separated from their main support base (MSB).  
Though some locations are less than a 30-minute drive, the furthest locations can be in 
excess of a three-hour drive in ideal conditions and even more with impaired driving 
conditions from the poor weather that is common at such sites, especially in the winter.  
This geographic separation introduces a multitude of considerations unique to ICBM 
maintenance that other Air Force maintenance units do not have.  
History of the Nuclear Enterprise 
Though the development and wartime use of nuclear weapons during World War 
II are well known, the path from development to today is not.  From Strategic Air 
Command (SAC) through the Cold War and into the 21st Century, the overall focus on 
nuclear weapons and the policies of each presidential administration have varied over the 
years.  
Post-World War II 
In the early aftermath of World War II, the U.S. Army Air Forces established the 
Strategic Air Command whose focus was to be able to execute long range offensive 
operations using atomic weapons.  Though early demonstrations to execute this mission 
were lackluster at best, under the guidance of General Curtis LeMay, the accuracy of 
nuclear bombing exercises went from missing the target by over two miles in 1947 to 
coming within 2,000 feet of the target by 1949 (Keeney, 2012).  Under General LeMay, 
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SAC developed into a premier organization with the strictest of standards.  The 
leadership demanded a standard of perfection and deviations from that standard were 
dealt with quickly (Meilinger, 2014).   
The Cold War 
SIOP-62 was the war plan developed under the Eisenhower administration which 
detailed the targeting and execution of a massive strike against Russian and Chinese 
forces.  Under the Kennedy administration, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara 
pushed for the war plan to become more flexible and include a second-strike capability 
built around ICBMs as well as submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) (Burns & 
Siracusa, 2013).  This new war plan, known as SIOP-63, increased SAC’s responsibility 
and saw the development and integration of silo-based ICBMs into SAC.  This missile 
force, being tasked with a second-strike, retaliatory mission, received the same scrutiny 
of perfection from SAC as the bomber force under General LeMay.   
This nuclear triad formed the basis for American nuclear deterrence policy 
throughout the rest of the Cold War and still exists today.  Each leg on its own has 
strengths and weaknesses as shown in Table 1.  However, when organized together, they 
form a strong cohesion that provides stable deterrence pressure to rational international 
actors.   
The following presidential administrations saw tensions with Russia ebb and flow 
based on increased stockpile levels, increased weapon yields, and enhanced defensive 
capabilities, such as anti-ballistic missile systems designed to defeat ICBM strikes.  In 
1974, President Nixon published NSDM-242 which stated that “The fundamental mission 
of the U.S. nuclear force is to deter nuclear war…” and that the strategic posture needed a 
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survivable ICBM force for “…protection and coercion during and after major nuclear 
conflict” (Nixon, 1974).  As such, the strictest adherence to technical guidance in 
operations, maintenance, and security was required within the ICBM community to 
ensure the highest level of readiness.  The SAC Munitions Officer Handbook offers 
insight into the mindset expected within SAC and the ICBM community.  Statements 
such as ‘be prepared for war,’ ‘be tough,’ and ‘don’t tolerate incompetence’ are extensive 
throughout the handbook (Belisle & Hickman, n.d.).  
Table 1.  Strengths and Weaknesses of the Nuclear Triad 
 Strengths Weaknesses 
Bomber • Only recallable nuclear force 
• Ability to forward deploy as a 
show of force 
• Able to be dispersed prior to attack 
• Requires the most time to bring 
on alert 
• Least survivable 
• Easiest to counter once 
launched 
SLBM • Considered the most 
survivable/assured retaliation 
• Prompt launch capability 
• Few subs on alert at any given 
time 
• Limited number of warheads  
ICBM • Large geographic dispersion able 
to absorb a nuclear attack 
• Fastest launch capability 
• High warhead count 
• Immobile and easily targetable 
• No ability to show escalation 
 
 
The Post-Cold War Environment 
In the early 1990s, there began a shift away from the strict adherence to standards 
that was the bedrock of SAC.  With the dissolution of SAC in 1992, the Air Force’s 
nuclear entities were split primarily between two Major Commands, with the bomber 
force falling under Air Combat Command (ACC) and the ICBM force falling under Air 
Force Space Command (AFSPC).  Additionally, the closure of San Antonio Air Logistics 
Center in 1995 disbanded the focal point of nuclear logistics and decentralized control 
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among six separate organizations (Defense Science Board Permanent Task Force on 
Nuclear Weapons Surety, 2011). 
With the swift and overwhelming victory of the Gulf War led by new precision 
strike capabilities, the purview of leadership over the nuclear forces began to waiver.  
Early in the post-Gulf War environment, some within the Air Force identified a sense of 
false security and called for caution to not allow the deterioration of nuclear capabilities 
(Paulsen, 1994).  It became common thought among civilian and military organizations 
that future wars would be quick endeavors won by the increasingly technological 
precision strike forces and that nuclear deterrence was a relic of the past.  This became 
evident in 2001 when the Nuclear Posture Review under President George W. Bush 
called for a fundamental shift in thinking to a New Triad which incorporated nuclear 
forces, non-nuclear forces, and defense infrastructure as the three areas that would 
provide strategic deterrence in a rapidly changing international security environment 
(Department of Defense, 2002).   
The 2000s Through Present Day 
Towards the end of the 2000s, two events transpired which highlighted the 
degradation within the nuclear enterprise.  In 2006, four MM III critical components were 
mistakenly sent to Taiwan instead of UH-1 helicopter batteries and were not discovered 
missing until 18 months after the shipment occurred.  Additionally, in 2007 six nuclear 
warheads were flown from Minot AFB to Barksdale AFB within cruise missiles loaded 
on a B-52.  In subsequent reviews, lack of attention to detail, failure to follow prescribed 
technical procedures, and an overall lack of leadership and oversight in the nuclear 
enterprise were found to be common among Air Force operations, maintenance, and 
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logistics organizations tasked with nuclear missions (Defense Science Board Permanent 
Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety, 2011).  Additionally, shifting priorities had left 
the nuclear enterprise and policy makers facing $100 billion worth of modernization 
decisions without first-hand experience in such matters (Office of the Under Secretary for 
Acquisition Technology and Logistics, 2008).   
Many reports from this timeframe had a common theme, that the Air Force and 
USSTRATCOM “…should restore the rigor and focus necessary to reestablish and 
sustain the demanding proficiency necessary for nuclear operations” (Office of the Under 
Secretary for Acquisition Technology and Logistics, 2008).  From this, the Air Force 
decided to partially return to a SAC-like structure where most organizations with a 
nuclear or non-nuclear, long-range strike mission and those logistics organizations that 
directly supported that mission would fall under one MAJCOM known as Air Force 
Global Strike Command (AFGSC).   
According to the literature, there are still issues within the nuclear enterprise 
related to morale, discipline, and attention to detail.  One recent example of this is the 
cheating that occurred at an ICBM base where missile operators were found to be 
distributing answers to monthly proficiency checks (Holmes, 2014).  Efforts from 
AFGSC and the Air Force to improve these personnel issues (such as the Force 
Improvement Program) have seen success in bringing about change to the culture of the 
nuclear enterprise (Raatz, 2015). 
Currently, the focus has shifted away from personnel issues to infrastructure and 
modernization issues.  Underinvestment over the past two decades has left the nuclear 
forces in need of modernization to sustain strategic nuclear deterrence.  An open letter 
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signed by eight former commanders of SAC and USSTRATCOM declares that based on 
the actions of Russia, China, and North Korea, the need for a modernized nuclear triad is 
clear and that a lack of modernization or an outright removal of one leg would be 
inherently detrimental to US security (Kehler et al., 2017).  However, as mentioned 
earlier in Chapter I, the costs associated with such acquisition efforts may employ up to 
6% of the DOD budget in coming years. 
MM III Divergence from Air Force Sustainment Best Practices 
As stated earlier, the MM III utilizes technology from the 1960s in order to 
remain on alert and ready as a viable nuclear deterrence force.  Throughout its life cycle, 
there have been programs to modernize or replace many components of the system and 
associated test equipment.  For example, the Environmental Control System (ECS) within 
both the MAF and LF was designed with a 10-year service life and only saw one 
modification in the mid-80s (Systems Engineering and Technical Analysis Staff, 2004).  
A replacement ECS system was fielded in the early 2010s due to a lack of replacement 
parts and increasing failure rates.  Similar programs have been performed on missile 
components and C2 systems to ensure a viable launch function in a nuclear war 
environment.   
While it is common among aging Air Force weapon systems, such as the B-52 
which was fielded in the 1960s, to receive updates and modifications throughout its 
operational phase, the ICBM community did not integrate the best practices of the Air 
Force with respect to life cycle management.  Mr. Lawrence Kingsley stated in a 2014 
interview that “The entire Air Force is aging, but while the rest of the Air Force moved 
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on with sustainment, ICBMs did not…” (Rowell, 2014).  One such example of the ICBM 
community failing to modernize is the cost per flying hour concept.   
Cost per flying hour is a common metric used by life cycle managers of aircraft to 
forecast sustainment requirements (Sperry & Burns, 2003).  As parts fail and require 
replacement, costs per flying hour increase.  This increase in costs can, in turn, be tied 
directly to the flying hour program that is common among airframes.  Each fiscal year the 
Air Force determines how many flying hours on each airframe are required to keep pilots 
proficient and ready for operational tasking.  By knowing the cost per flying hour, the Air 
Force can budget sustainment costs.  Coupled with failure rate data, the Air Force can 
also predict how many spare parts will be required to maintain the aircraft.  Variability 
plays a major role in preventing accurate models, but basic forecasting can be done to get 
a general idea of what sustainment levels will be required to support each weapon 
system. 
Though this model was developed in the 1960s, it became prevalent throughout 
the Air Force in the post-Cold War environment of the mid-90s (Rose Jr., 1997).  This 
was directly after the ICBM community transitioned under AFSPC which had limited 
resources devoted to aircraft sustainment, unlike ACC which contained the nuclear 
bomber force.  It was not until nearly 20 years later that research considered developing a 
cost per flying hour model for the MM III (Miller, 2012). 
Another area where the Air Force modernized and ICBMs did not was within the 
realm of maintenance data management.  The Integrated Maintenance Data System 
(IMDS), formerly known as the Core Automated Maintenance System (CAMS), is a 
maintenance data collection tool that can aggregate maintenance data inputs at the 
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technician level to provide sustainment managers the information they needed to perform 
life cycle management functions.  Not only are serial numbered assets able to be tracked, 
but failure rates and maintenance task data are stored and compiled in order to help 
forecast future sustainment requirements.  One intended use of IMDS is to link 
maintenance and supply data in an effort to bolster the supply chain (Office of the 
Secretary of the Air Force, 2007).  IMDS also links to other sustainment and supply chain 
management systems used by the Air Force.  The 15 April 2007 version of Technical 
Order 00-20-2 gives a description given to IMDS that is over two pages long detailing the 
functionalities and capabilities that it provides aircraft maintenance and sustainment 
personnel.  Until the early 2010s, this was not the system used for documenting MM III 
maintenance.  Instead, the Improved Maintenance Management Programs (IMMP) was 
the preferred tool for MM III maintenance data collection.  Less than half a page is used 
to describe the purpose, and intended use of IMMP and the description does not mention 
integration with the supply chain other than allowing sustainment managers access to the 
maintenance data. 
In addition to a data management system that is not as robust as the Air Force’s 
standard operating platform, the measurement of maintenance performance is lacking 
within the ICBM sustainment community.  The Air Force Maintenance Management 
Handbook, first published in 2001, lays out the basis for the metrics deemed important to 
unit-level maintenance leaders within an aircraft maintenance organization.  Through this 
handbook, sustainment managers seek to understand and describe the health of the fleet 
using measurements and standards to gauge performance.  The handbook also gives front 
line supervisors a list of things to look for if the metrics begin to move in an undesirable 
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direction.  However, nearly ten years after the aircraft maintenance community adopted a 
robust metrics system, the sustainment community published the ICBM Maintenance 
Metrics Handbook.   
Additional review of the literature showed that since the 1990s researchers have 
conducted substantial amounts of work towards how the reduction in strategic weapon 
systems affects the concept of nuclear deterrence (Nyland, 1998) (Pedersen, 2009) 
(Woolf, 2015).  However, there is minimal literature on effective support operations (e.g., 
maintenance, supply chain operations, security) for the MM III.  One example of a 
research study to increase the effectiveness of maintenance resources investigated the 
feasibility of an innovative inventory management technique to locate spare parts in the 
missile field, thus potentially reducing the need to return to the main base if additional 
spare parts are required during a maintenance task (Hughes, 2015). 
Another area of research focused on effective security forces placements in order 
to support maintenance operations (Dawson, Bell, & Weir, 2007) (Overholts II, Bell, & 
Arostegui, 2009) in an attempt to optimize personnel utilization and increase maintenance 
efficiency.  Additional research sought to define the impact that a reduced alert rate 
would have on maintenance personnel utilization rates (Kravitsky, 2007).  Though these 
areas of research are important, they pale in comparison to research done to support 
maintenance and sustainment efforts throughout the aircraft community in the Air Force. 
Reliability-Centered Maintenance  
Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM) is a maintenance policy that relies on 
probability to make informed decisions on when to perform maintenance.  The goal of 
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any maintenance action is to ensure that mechanical equipment can operate appropriately 
when required (Moubray, 1997).  This is defined by the user as the operating context of 
the equipment.  Whenever the equipment is no longer performing within that operating 
context, the system experiences degraded capabilities, and thus maintenance actions are 
required.  However, with redundancy built into a system, degraded capabilities may not 
cause system failure.  Thus, the entire system may still be able to function appropriately 
even though a subcomponent may have failed. 
The goal of RCM is to create a maintenance policy based on system functionality 
and operating context based on the design of the entire system.  Over the past 60 years, 
sustainment communities have changed their views on how components fail.  Initial 
failure models were based solely on an increasing failure rate as assets aged as indicated 
by the pattern ‘B’ shown in Figure 2.  With the increase in the mechanization of 
processes, more attention has been given to industrial engineering which has identified 
five additional failure curves.  These additional failure curves more accurately model the 
life cycle of mechanical systems and can be utilized to more accurately predict failure of 
individual components.   
Pattern ‘A’ is a bathtub curve which indicates components with a high rate of 
failure early in its life cycle and after a certain amount of time begins wearing out at an 
increased rate.  Pattern ‘C’ indicates a steadily increasing rate of failure with no 
significant increase due to wear out.  Pattern ‘D’ is indicative of components that are 
produced with a high level of robustness and thus do not have a high early failure rate 
whereas pattern ‘E’ indicates a constant failure rate over the entire life cycle.  Finally, the 
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curve indicated by pattern ‘F’ is known as an infant mortality curve which models items 
that have high early failure rates that reduce to a constant failure rate with time.   
 
Figure 2.  Six Failure Probability Curves (Moubray, 1997) 
Combining these two concepts of understanding the operating context of the 
system as well as its failure rates allows for the development of a reliability-based 
maintenance concept.  The basic concept of this is explained using Equations 1 and 2 
whereby once the probability density function for failure is determined, the reliability, or 
the probability that the system has not failed at time t, can be calculated.  By 
understanding what constitutes unacceptable performance (e.g. failure) and at what rate 
that occurs, sustainment managers can then develop a preventative maintenance policy 
based on their level of risk acceptance of a failure.  
 
𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) =  ∫ 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−∞                                                   (1) 
𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) =  1 − 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡)                                                      (2) 
 
Where: 
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F(t) = the probability of failure before time t 
f(t) = the probability density function for failure  
R(t) = the probability of survival at time t 
t = time 
 
Through the understanding of when the risk of failure becomes unacceptable for 
all critical components within a system allows for sustainment managers to set the overall 
timeframe for preventative maintenance.  As seen in many industrial settings, downtime 
of a system due to maintenance causes a decrease in performance and prevents the 
creation of products to sell, thus lowering profitability.  In the power generation and 
distribution industry, excessive downtimes can lead to economic losses which highlights 
the importance of scheduling downtime to perform comprehensive preventative 
maintenance rather than perform a run-to-failure maintenance model where downtimes 
are more frequent even though they may be shorter in duration (Dehghanian, Fotuhi-
Firuzabad, Aminifar, & Billinton, 2013).  Thus, there is increased emphasis on using 
RCM as a means to build a maintenance policy based on a determined level of risk 
acceptance.   
One of the earliest successes of developing an RCM policy came in the mid-
1970s when United Airlines adopted such a policy for the 20,000-hour inspection of their 
new Boeing 747 aircraft.  Under their old maintenance policy for the DC-8s (considered 
to be a less technologically complex aircraft than the 747s), the 20,000-hour inspection 
required over four million man-hours to complete.  However, with RCM principles built 
into the maintenance policy, United Airlines was able to complete the same inspection on 
their 747s with only 66,000 man-hours (Moubray, 1997).   
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Many industries have realized reduced costs and increased effectiveness by using 
RCM since its inception in the 1970s.  Within the military, organic research studies have 
investigated utilizing these concepts on existing weapon systems such as the F-15 
(Martin, 1997) and H-60 (Reeder, 2014).  Additionally, these concepts are currently 
being designed into new weapon system acquisitions.   
A subset of the RCM model, known as Condition-based Maintenance (CBM), has 
also been adopted by the military as a modernized maintenance concept.  The basis for 
this model is similar to that of RCM; however, it leverages technology to monitor the 
performance of a system.  Rather than using failure models to predict when failure may 
occur, CBM uses operating tolerances as a means to determine when the operating 
context of a component has degraded to a point that is unacceptable.  Once the 
component is outside the acceptable tolerance level, indicators are triggered to inform 
sustainment managers that the system requires maintenance.  A partial list of 
technologies used in CBM to monitor condition are shown in Table 2 (Levitt, 1997). 
 
Table 2.  Examples of Proven CBM Technologies 
Technology Use 
Chemical Analysis Monitor oil contamination 
Vibration Analysis Monitor rotating components 
Temperature Measurement Monitor HVAC/Identify friction 
Ultrasonic Inspection Determine thickness of corrosion 
Visual Fiber Optic Monitoring Inspect hard to reach locations 
 
By knowing when a system is out of tolerance yet still functioning, sustainment 
managers can schedule maintenance before a failure occurs in a manner that allows for 
multiple maintenance actions to occur.  Additionally, monitoring specific component 
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functions allows for maintenance personnel to know what component is out of tolerance 
so that they can bring the correct tools and spare parts to repair or replace the component 
rather than spend time troubleshooting the system.  
A 1988 study illustrates some of the benefits of switching to a predictive 
maintenance policy such as RCM and CBM.  A survey of 500 manufacturing companies 
across multiple countries and industries (i.e., electrical power generation, food 
processing, textiles) examined the benefits gained through the successful integration of 
predictive maintenance policies.  The findings are summarized in Table 3.   
 
Table 3. Benefits of a Successful Predictive Maintenance Program (Mobley, 1990) 
Operations and Maintenance (O&M) 
Maintenance Costs Reduced 50-80% 
Overtime Premiums Reduced 20-50% 
Spare Parts Inventory Reduced 20-30% 
Machine Performance 
Machine Breakdown Reduced 50-60% 
Machine Downtime Reduced 50-80% 
Machine Life Increased 20-30% 
 
The DoD has outlined its policy pertaining to CBM in DOD Instruction 4151.22, 
Condition Based Maintenance Plus (CBM+) for Materiel Maintenance, which states that 
CBM+ be adopted by new weapon systems and that existing weapon systems should also 
begin adopting these practices “…where it is technically feasible and beneficial” 
(Department of Defense, 2012).  It also defines CBM+ as:  
CBM+ is the application and integration of appropriate processes, technologies, 
and knowledge-based capabilities to achieve the target availability, reliability, and 
operation and support costs of DoD systems and components across their life 
cycle. At its core, CBM+ is maintenance performed based on evidence of need, 
integrating RCM analysis with those enabling processes, technologies, and 
capabilities that enhance the readiness and maintenance effectiveness of DoD 
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systems and components.  CBM+ uses a systems engineering approach to collect 
data, enable analysis, and support the decision-making processes for system 
acquisition, modernization, sustainment, and operations (Department of Defense, 
2012). 
 
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter’s Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) 
is an example of how CBM can be integrated into a weapon system.  Sensors embedded 
within the aircraft continually monitor weapon system performance to indicate when 
components and systems are not operating within tolerance.  When this occurs, ALIS 
alerts the supply chain and repair network to indicate a need for replacement parts and 
manpower to return the airplane to a functional status. 
Previous attempts within the DoD to implement a CBM+ maintenance policy 
demonstrate the ability to produce multiple benefits.  For example, an Army initiative to 
develop a CBM+ strategy for a portion of their aviation branch produced notable benefits 
in safety as well as weapon system availability.  Specifically, a 9-12% reduction in 
potential mishaps, as well as a 3.7-10.3% increase in readiness, was observed in aircraft 
that had adopted a CBM+ maintenance strategy (OSD CBM+ Action Group, 2010). 
Prospect Theory 
Prospect Theory is an economics-based theory that focuses not just on decision 
making under uncertainty, but also includes a propensity for loss aversion as a different 
function of a decision maker’s level of risk.  Unlike Utility Theory which focuses on the 
expected utility gained from a decision, Prospect Theory expands to include the potential 
for loss when faced with a decision as shown in Figure 3.  In doing so, the theory 
develops each decision to be framed from a reference point at the current state.  As 
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demonstrated by the theory, decision makers tend to favor decisions based on certainty 
rather than uncertainty, even in a probabilistic environment (Slovic, Fischhoff, & 
Lichtenstein, 1982).  Thus, there is a propensity for individuals to insure themselves 
against an event that has high probability and a low value of loss rather than insuring 
against a low probability event with a high value of loss.  
 
Figure 3.  Prospect Theory Value Function (Kahneman, 2011) 
Summary 
Chapter II outlines the literature review conducted for this research.  It explores 
the nature of the MM III weapon system as well as a history of the nuclear enterprise.  A 
gap in progress between Air Force best practices and practices found in the ICBM 
community was also explored.  Additionally, the literature concerning RCM and CBM 
concepts is compiled and summarized.  Lastly, a summary of Prospect Theory is 
provided as a means to introduce the theoretical lens used throughout this research. 
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III.  Methodology 
Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe and outline the methodology used to 
answer the research questions that were described in Chapter I.  It outlines the case study 
method for performing exploratory research and how those methods were applied to this 
research.  Lastly, it reviews the theories that were used as potential means to analyze the 
collected information. 
Data Collection 
This research utilizes the case study methodology as a means to analyze the data 
in an attempt to answer the research questions.  This method was chosen due to the fact 
that it is well suited for complex and poorly understood situations (Leedy & Ormrod, 
2013).  To understand the situation, data collection focused on compiling an extensive 
collection of both primary and secondary sources.  The research established proper 
bounds so that extraneous data would not apply undue influence on the analysis of the 
situation.  These bounds focused on the people, policies, and procedures related to the 
nuclear enterprise in general and ICBM sustainment in particular.  Data sources 
pertaining to topics such as organizational culture, nuclear weapon employment policies, 
and operational effectiveness are considered to understand the climate of ICBM 
sustainment throughout history for both the macro and micro-level view of the situation.  
Additionally, data sources pertaining to these topics from multiple points in time are used 
and grouped together into two timeframes to gain a complete understanding: 1947 
through 1992 and 1992 to the present. 
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Ultimately, the policies surrounding nuclear weapons start with how each 
presidential administration views the role of nuclear weapons in their geopolitical 
environment.  As such, data sources explaining these views are used as the starting point 
for each timeframe and explored further using the military’s interpretation and 
implementation of these policies.  Data collection also included sources that explained 
how people, policies, and procedures were organized in order to meet the strategic 
objectives of the United States.  Where research failed to produce primary sources, 
secondary sources were used as a means to fill in the gaps in research. 
Organization of the Data 
With a comprehensive collection of data sources, common themes and trends are 
recognized after a thorough perusal of the sources pertaining to each defined timeframe.  
This technique, as developed by Creswell’s 2014 work, utilizes a systematic approach to 
analyzing the mass of data that often accompanies qualitative research.  To do this, the 
researcher organizes the data by timeframe and by topic.  From there, data sources are 
used to identify common themes and general descriptions that supported each other so as 
to triangulate an understanding of the nature of the situation for each timeframe listed 
above (Creswell, 2014).  This triangulation was used as a procedure to ensure the validity 
of the research method performed.  
Developing the Context Using Theory 
Next, these themes and trends are interpreted by exposing them to a theoretical 
lens and determining how well the theory matched the historical context.  By viewing the 
themes through a theoretical lens, the bias is reduced in the research method (Leedy & 
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Ormrod, 2013).  Additionally, by using theory, a robust case for an explanation of why 
the situations existed is developed.  Prospect Theory, as listed in Chapter II, is used to 
view the themes pertaining to the data sources up until 1992 as a means validate that the 
theory accurately explained why events occurred in a certain manner. 
Exploring the Current State 
Because Prospect Theory was determined to accurately represented the past 
environment of the nuclear enterprise, it is again used to analyze the data pertaining to the 
current state.  This analysis provides a way to synthesize the data into a coherent view 
and to develop expectations as provided by the theory.  These expectations, though not 
predictive in nature, are used as a means to explore what the future state of the ICBM 
sustainment community might look like under a reliability-centered policy for 
maintenance.   
From these future expectations, the research follows with a set of propositions on 
how the ICBM sustainment community can achieve the future state using the Doctrine, 
Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policy 
(DOTMLPF-P) model used by military planners.  These propositions attempt to link the 
expectations of the current state, as described by Prospect Theory, and the benefits of an 
RCM and CBM-centric maintenance policy.  
Summary 
Chapter III explores the methodology used to carry out the case study research 
including the data collection method and how the data is synthesized into a holistic view 
of the situation facing the ICBM sustainment community.  Additionally, it explores the 
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role of theory, specifically Prospect Theory, in the research and how it applies to create 
expectations for the future state and propositions on how to achieve those expectations.  
The results of this analysis are found in Chapter IV.   
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IV.  Analysis and Results 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter contains the case study analysis and results from this research.  It 
outlines the common themes from primary and secondary sources and analyzes those 
themes through the theoretical lens described by Prospect Theory.  This analysis is then 
expounded upon through the development of propositions for how to progress using the 
concepts of RCM and CBM as the basis for the future state. 
Tuning the Theoretical Lens 
The historical research related to the nuclear enterprise and ICBM sustainment is 
analyzed to identify overarching themes that are then viewed through a theoretical lens.  
To start, the directives from the presidents from the 1960s through the 1980s all discuss 
the importance of having a credible ICBM force that can survive a first strike and be used 
as an overwhelming retaliatory force.  This is considered to be one of the strengths of the 
MM III as identified in Table 1.  The fact that the weapon system is always on alert aides 
in its usefulness in providing a strategic deterrence (O’Rourke, 2010).  
From these the presidential policy documents during the Cold War, the 
Department of Defense and the targeting community developed a target list structure that 
was dependent on the number of warheads available rather than having a set target 
structure which would determine the required number of warheads on alert (Sauer, 2005).  
This is known as the concept of maximum deterrence, where more on alert weapons 
equate to a higher level of deterrence.  This concept is supported by the SAC Munitions 
Officer Handbook which states “Munitions functions must ensure maximum availability 
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of trained personnel and [War Reserve Material] munitions to support wartime and 
contingency operations” (Belisle & Hickman, n.d.).  Thus, the clear theme under this 
concept is that the goal of the nuclear sustainment community up until 1992 was to have 
the most number of warheads available and set the target requirements to the capability 
rather than to build a capability that matched the requirements. 
Throughout the literature, there are references to ‘gaps’ in capabilities that fueled 
the Cold War mindset.  These gaps between the perceived Soviet capabilities in bombers, 
weapon yields, missiles, and anti-ballistic missile systems led to increases in military 
spending.  These increases in military spending helped drive U.S. capabilities higher to 
close these gaps and ensure high levels of deterrence (Higgs, 1988).   
In order to apply a theoretical lens to this historical context, the concept of 
deterrence as a substitute for value is utilized.  Under Prospect Theory, value is 
considered to be a measure of how an individual attributes the usefulness of the outcome 
relative to their current position (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  Thus, when value is 
replaced with deterrence, the researchers found that Prospect Theory accurately describes 
events during the Cold War. 
The concept of risk aversion under Prospect Theory states that for a positive 
value, decision makers prefer decisions with high probabilities of success to riskier 
decisions with lower probabilities of an outcome that may produce higher value (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1992).  When value is replaced with deterrence, the theory then states that 
decision makers prefer decisions with a high probability of providing a known level of 
deterrence to decisions that have a lesser probability to provide unknown levels of 
deterrence.  This is summarized as the concept of ‘this is the way we have always done it’ 
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where the higher probability of success in providing deterrence outweighs the desire to 
seek out more effective operations where higher levels of deterrence are uncertain.  
Through this historical context, the decision to increase warhead levels is the risk-adverse 
method to provide maximum deterrence. 
Applying Prospect Theory to the post-Cold War Environment 
The literature concerning the post-Cold War exposes two common themes related 
to the nuclear enterprise.  The first theme concerns a fundamental shift in mindset to 
valuing the cost of defense and deterrence over the absolute amount of defense and 
deterrence provided where the second focuses on innovation to produce more effective 
and efficient results.  Before the end of the Cold War, the literature describes a situation 
where the policy favored a level of deterrence which was supported by military 
expenditures.  However, with the end of the Cold War, the new policy focused on fixing 
military budgets and optimizing the output provided by such levels.  This is evident in 
that military spending was relatively flat between 1993 and 1999 (Durham, 2015).  
Additionally, in the post-Cold War environment, there were several efforts to reduce the 
size of the nuclear arsenal.  Though the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) 
was drafted prior to the end of the Cold War, Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama all 
oversaw efforts to reduce the number of active warheads within the nuclear arsenal either 
through treaties with Russia or unilaterally.  In reference to one reduction of ICBMs for 
compliance under START II, it was said that “These missiles may still have a role to play 
in U.S. national security strategy, but they may not be needed in the numbers that were 
required when the United States faced the Soviet threat” (Woolf, 2015). 
34 
This sentiment is prevalent in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) conducted 
under the Obama administration.  One section of the NPR discusses the importance of the 
nuclear triad and how it is a cost-effective method for maintaining deterrence.  However, 
with the aging infrastructure of the MM III force, the NPR states that a study is required 
to “…consider a range of possible deployment options, with the objective of defining a 
cost-effective approach that supports continued reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons while 
promoting stable deterrence” (Department of Defense, 2010).  Under this construct, it can 
be seen that rather than operating under the concept of maximum deterrence, as 
referenced above, the operating environment is one of minimum deterrence required. 
Throughout the post-Cold War environment, the role of efficiency and 
effectiveness became prevalent.  Starting with the Quality Air Force (QAF) program of 
the early 1990s and continuing to today through programs such as Air Force Smart 
Operations for the 21st Century (AFSO21) and Expeditionary Logistics for the 21st 
Century (eLog21), the Air Force has invested high levels of time and energy in order to 
encourage innovation to increase efficiency and effectiveness throughout all operations. 
As stated in Chapter II, the cost per flying hour model is one of many innovations 
during the early stages of this push for efficiency (Rose Jr., 1997).  Another source of 
innovation comes from the adoption of Activity-Based Costing methods (ABC) at the 
depots to more effectively track and understand costs in order to drive down waste 
(Graves, 2001).  The push for increased innovation is highlighted by statements from two 
former Chiefs of Staff of the Air Force, Generals Schwartz and Welsh, that “Every 
Airman is an Innovator” which was also the theme of the 2014 CSAF reading list (Power, 
2014). 
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To overlay Prospect Theory on the current climate described above, the concept 
of cost as the Y-axis is used to replace the concept of value rather than the previous 
concept of deterrence.  Thus, the new goal is to reduce the cost of sustainment.  In doing 
so, the theory describes a state where the Air Force has shifted from a risk-adverse to a 
risk-seeking mindset.  This is because the current state describes a certain level of 
expenditure to meet the defense requirements.  Thus, the cost of defense and deterrence 
under the current conditions becomes a guaranteed loss.  Stated differently, the costs 
associated with the current state of operations are dollars that cannot be recovered nor 
spent on other programs.  However, Prospect Theory states that in this environment, risk-
seeking decision makers choose options that have a potential to reduce this loss rather 
than stay with the guaranteed loss (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).  When adjusted to the 
concept of costs, risk seeking decision makers will make decisions that have the potential 
to reduce costs rather than keep with the status quo and the known costs.   
These concepts are illustrated using Figure 4 where the center square represents 
the current way of operating.  Within this area are the procedures and methods that are 
currently outlined in Air Force Instructions (AFIs), Technical Orders (TOs), and other 
policies that are approved methods.  The second square that encases the central square, 
representing alternate but unproven ways of operating, incorporates methods that would 
be considered safe.  However, these methods may or may not be more effective towards 
meeting the end goal.  The outer square represents alternative methods that would not be 
considered even if they met the end goal. 
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Figure 4.  Conceptual Representation of Possible Processes 
 
Under the risk-adverse environment of the Cold War where the goal was 
maximum deterrence, the benefits of operating within the safe space outweighed the 
desire to seek out alternative methods.  This is because of the uncertainty that alternative 
methods would lead to higher levels of deterrence and the possibility that they would be 
considered an unsafe process.  However, in the modern environment where the risk-
seeking mindset is prevalent, the goal is to be cost-effective.  Thus, there is a greater 
likelihood to seek out those alternative methods that are within the second square in 
Figure 4 which are considered safe and also provide cost savings.  This situation can be 
described by the push for innovation in the post-Cold War environment as described 
above.  When applied to the nuclear sustainment community, it is seen that, until 
recently, they have maintained the Cold War mindset of staying within the center square 
of what is known and safe, (being risk-adverse) and are only now starting to pursue 
innovative concepts found within the second square (risk-seeking).     
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Analysis of the Current MM III Maintenance Policy 
Because Prospect Theory describes the current state as one that is open to 
innovation, this research focuses on concepts that could benefit the goal of driving down 
costs within the MM III sustainment community.  Currently, much of the maintenance 
model for the MM III is under what is known as a run-to-failure policy where items are 
replaced upon failure.  Though there are periodic inspections and environmental sensors 
to detect failures and abnormal conditions within the MM III system, they are not 
necessarily predictive in nature.  Additionally, because there are many systems and 
components that make up the MM III, failure of a non-monitored item may not be 
discovered until a scheduled inspection takes place which could be months or possibly 
years after failure.   
The AFI governing MM III maintenance describes a “find and fix” mentality 
under the topic of Preventative Maintenance (PM) where maintenance personnel identify 
discrepancies through periodic inspections and attempt to make repairs on the spot 
(Department of the Air Force, 2017).  Under this maintenance policy, the AFI describes 
how preventative maintenance is conducted in response to a scheduled inspection where a 
component is found to be out of tolerance.  Because of the geographic separation between 
the MSB and the LFs or the MAFs, many inspection intervals are aligned to reduce the 
number of dispatches required.   
This maintenance policy described above is considered to be the foundation for 
the first generation (fix it when it breaks) and the second generation (scheduled 
overhauls) concept of maintenance policies (Moubray, 1997).  The main concern of this 
first generation, run-to-failure maintenance policy is that it is considered to be the most 
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expensive method to maintain a system due to high costs associated with spare parts and 
high system downtime (Mobley, 1990).  Though it may be appropriate for some 
components within a system such as low-cost items, a one-size-fits-all maintenance 
policy that primarily relies on a run-to-failure model has significant opportunities to 
increase effectiveness.   
Moubray’s third generation of maintenance policy focuses on utilizing RCM and 
CBM concepts in order to bring attention to working effectively (‘doing the right job’) 
rather than just efficiently (‘doing the job right’).  This is because under the third 
generation of maintenance the expectation of maintenance has evolved away from being 
a ‘necessary evil’ and instead is seen as a means by which higher availability and 
reliability can produce greater cost effectiveness (Moubray, 1997).  Experts in the field of 
maintenance management caution against an environment where the focus is solely on 
efficiency and cutting costs without taking into consideration the effectiveness of the 
overall maintenance strategy (Levitt, 1997).  To combat this, the literature describes a 
multitude of maintenance strategies and associated tactics used to carry out the strategic 
goals. 
From this analysis, two significant findings are discussed.  The first is that the 
environment within the Air Force as well as the nuclear sustainment community has 
shifted away from a risk-adverse environment to a risk-seeking environment.  Second, 
though MM III sustainment efforts have realized gains in efficiency, there remains to be 
found gains in effectiveness, especially within the maintenance policy employed.  
Because of these two situations existing concurrently, it appears that the environment is 
acceptable to seek out innovation to increase effectiveness.   
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This is not to say that new procedures should be adopted without going through 
the proper vetting process for innovation.  The concept of nuclear surety is where the 
existing policies, procedures, and controls ensure that nuclear weapons are not involved 
in any accidents, incidents, or unauthorized detonations (Department of the Air Force, 
2016).  Innovation without verification is dangerous and in direct violation of nuclear 
surety.  However, properly vetted innovation can lead to gains in efficiency as well as 
effectiveness.  
Statement of Propositions 
As discussed previously, the prevailing goal in the nuclear enterprise is to provide 
the proper level of deterrence in a cost-effective manner.  Thus, more effective operating 
methods must be sought out in order to realize additional cost savings.  As such, the case 
has been made that RCM and CBM techniques may be beneficial in achieving this goal 
and are in line with current DoD policy.  However, there are barriers to implementing 
such a strategy that must be addressed before successful implementation can take place.  
Therefore, this research develops a list of three propositions to further the discussion with 
regards to how RCM and CBM maintenance policies may benefit the MM III 
sustainment community.  In doing so, these propositions help answer the research 
questions listed in Chapter II.  
The first proposition is that in order to develop a successful RCM maintenance 
policy there should be a merger between reliability and readiness.  Currently, there are 
two methods to calculate the alert rate for the MM III weapon system.  The first is the 
Raw Alert Rate which is described by Equation 3 and the second is the Command 
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Management Standard (CMS) Alert Rate as described by Equation 4 (Phillips et al., 
2011). 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 = 𝑇𝑇–𝑆𝑆–𝑈𝑈
𝑇𝑇
∗  100%                                      (3) 
Where, 
T = Total active inventory hours accrued 
S = Total scheduled downtime hours accrued 
U = Total unscheduled downtime hours accrued 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 = 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎–𝑈𝑈
𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎
∗  100%                                      (4) 
Where, 
Ta = Total possessed hours accrued 
U = Total unscheduled downtime hours accrued 
 
 These metrics are both lagging indicators to describe maintenance’s performance 
in keeping the weapon system on alert.  The CMS Alert Rate is calculated by removing 
the weapon systems that are scheduled for maintenance and focusing instead on the ratio 
of total hours on alert against hours attributed to unscheduled downtime.  However, when 
the variables are examined, it is seen that this metric is not a robust measurement of 
maintenance performance or fleet health and instead returns an overinflated 
representation of the facts.  By only relying on the hours attributed to unexpected failures 
as a ratio compared to the total hours attributed to the weapons that are on alert, single 
failures are unable to reduce the available hours significantly.  Compound this with the 
fact that once the weapon system is scheduled for maintenance, it is no longer accounted 
under the metric and that there are 150 assets per missile base, multiple failures 
throughout the measurement timeframe must occur for the alert rate to drop below 99%.  
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Therefore, actions by maintenance personnel have little impact on the CMS Alert Rate 
metric and thus does not provide maintenance leaders with a meaningful lagging 
indicator.    
 The alternative metric, the Raw Alert Rate, takes into consideration the total 
number of hours that the entire fleet could be on alert subtracted by all hours that 
individual weapon systems are not on alert.  Taking into consideration the weapon 
systems that accrue hours under scheduled and unscheduled maintenance, the metric 
provides a measurement that indicated how proactive maintenance personnel are in 
returning assets to a serviceable status.  Thus, this metric is in line with a reliability-
centered focus and can be used as the basis for an RCM policy.  As seen in Figure 5, 
there is a minimum number of LFs that must be alert at any given time to meet the 
wartime requirements for the MM III fleet.  This represents the minimum level of 
reliability required for the MM III weapon system.  However, due to modification 
programs and other requirements, there is an expected number of LFs that will be off 
alert at any given time.  To ensure that the MM III force never falls below the minimum 
required number, there is always expected to be a number of weapons on alert above and 
beyond the minimum required level which is identified as the safety factor. 
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Figure 5.  ICBM On Alert Levels 
When applied to RCM, sustainment decision makers can use this framework as a 
method to select an appropriate reliability level which should be within the safety factor.  
The higher the chosen reliability level is above the minimum required level, the less risk 
there is in not meeting the wartime required number of weapons on alert.  This allows for 
an expected number of weapon systems to always be off alert and sets the desired 
reliability level which would form the basis of an RCM strategy.  Additionally, the 
selected reliability level then becomes the goal by which the Raw Alert Rate can be 
measured against to provide a more accurate view of maintenance performance and its 
ability to meet required readiness levels.   
The second proposition is that in order to properly implement a modernized 
maintenance strategy, a decision matrix should be used to help identify what 
subcomponents of the MM III should adopt RCM techniques, CBM technologies, or 
remain under their current construct.  As stated earlier, a one size fits all maintenance 
strategy does not necessarily equate to the most effective way of maintaining a system.  
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An example decision matrix from the literature is provided in Figure 6 as a means to 
begin the identification process of what components may see increased value from 
adopting an enhanced maintenance policy.  
 
Figure 6.  Example RCM Decision Matrix (Carretero et al., 2003) 
 To adapt this framework to the MM III, the current maintenance priority system 
can be examined as a method to identify items that would likely not benefit from an 
enhanced maintenance policy.  Under the maintenance priority system discussed in 
Attachment 2 of AFI 21-202v2, discrepancies that are Priority 5 through Priority 9 are 
not considered to result in either a non-mission capable (NMC) condition nor a partially 
mission capable (PMC) condition.  Therefore, their criticality to the overall alert status of 
the weapon must be negligible and thus would likely be cost-efficient to remain under its 
current maintenance model.  Therefore, it would be beneficial to add another logic device 
at the start of Figure 6 that stated ‘Would the failure of the component result in a Priority 
5 through Priority 9 discrepancy? If yes, run-to-failure, if no, continue to question 2.’ 
44 
Additionally, Attachment 3 of AFI 21-202v1 identifies the Mission Essential 
Subsystem List (MESL) which contains those subsystems that would have an effect on 
the alert status of the weapon if it became NMC or PMC.  This would be a logical 
starting point for going through this process of identifying what maintenance concept 
would best fit the most essential subsystems within the MM III weapon system.  Once 
these decisions were made, the next step would be to follow the guidance outlined in 
DODI 4151.22 to determine if there is a cost benefit to adopting either an RCM or CBM 
policy for that subsystem.  It should again be noted here that the benefits of adopting such 
technologies before the full development of the GBSD program has economic value and 
should not be ignored in this analysis. 
The third proposition is that in order to sustain a high level of reliability, CBM 
technologies should be researched for integration into the MM III.  This is due in large 
part to the layout of the MM III infrastructure.  As explained in Chapter II, the MM III is 
a geographically separated weapon system which spans thousands of square miles around 
each MSB.  While there are sensors currently installed within the infrastructure to alert 
maintenance personnel of operating conditions that are not within approved tolerances, 
they provide little diagnostic information.  This means that maintenance personnel must 
be dispatched to perform troubleshooting to identify specific components which have 
failed and may not be equipped with the appropriate tools or replacement parts to return 
the system to full alert status. By properly incorporating CBM technologies, maintainers 
can be dispatched with greater knowledge of the condition of the weapon system and 
potentially even know which component is faulty, thus reducing the amount of time 
dedicated to troubleshooting.  
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Another benefit of incorporating CBM technologies into the MM III has to do 
with the replacement GBSD program.  According to studies done on civilian aircraft, 
almost 70% of items installed followed an infant mortality curve as represented by 
pattern ‘F’ in Figure 2; whereas only 7% were modeled under pattern ‘D’ which showed 
little to no early failures (Moubray, 1997).  Though this does not directly translate to all 
industries and components, it identifies a significant concern for newly developed 
components.  Components with high early failure rates increase the demand for 
maintenance resources which could exceed the planned resource capacity which would, 
in turn, lead to an increase in weapons off alert.   
With the development of a replacement system in works for the MM III, 
combating excessive infant mortality rates should be a focus.  Monitoring these systems 
using CBM technologies would lead to the ability to predict these early failures with 
higher accuracy and in a timely manner rather than having an early failure and not be 
aware of when it occurred.  The expected result would be that a high alert rate would be 
exhibited throughout the early failures due to the predictive nature of CBM technologies. 
Additionally, by working towards the integration of CBM technologies and 
policies before the installation of the GBSD produces two benefits.  First, the policies can 
be implemented and refined over the remaining life cycle of the MM III.  This would 
provide a longer timeline with which to roll out these changes so that the entire ICBM 
sustainment community can adapt to the new policies in a well-planned manner.  Second, 
Total Life Cycle System Management (TLCSM) principles “…stress the importance of 
early and strong emphasis on designing systems for supportability to facilitate operational 
readiness, minimize the logistics footprint, and achieve best value operations and support 
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cost after system deployment” (Cothran, 2008).  Current cost estimates put the GBSD 
acquisition program at $62-$100 billion which, as stated in Chapter I, represents a 
significant portion of future defense spending which would only increase if the 
integration of CBM technologies is delayed until after the acquisition program is 
complete (Mehta, 2016b).  In fact, Evolutionary Acquisition (where small modifications 
are made throughout the production cycle) and poorly defined initial requirements are 
two of the leading causes of cost overruns identified in major DoD acquisition programs 
(Porter et al., 2009).  Thus, assimilating these technologies into the existing infrastructure 
enables the GBSD to be designed around these technologies rather than attempt to build 
them into the new infrastructure post-deployment and risk higher integration costs.   
In addition to the two benefits listed above, there is a third potential benefit that 
the literature suggests may be on the horizon.  Current trends focusing on autonomous 
design (Friedrich, Lechler, & Verl, 2014) and information technology (Manickam, 2012), 
and potentially topics such as additive manufacturing and data analytics, have led 
researchers to postulate that the fourth generation of maintenance is on the horizon.  
Thus, modernizing the MM III maintenance policy to incorporate CBM should result in 
being in a better position to capture the benefits from the transformation to a fourth-
generation concept. 
Summary 
This chapter describes the analysis performed during this research starting with 
the selection of Prospect Theory as an appropriate theoretical lens and the application of 
that lens to the data representing the timeframe up until 1992.  An in-depth analysis 
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shows how Prospect Theory describes the current state within the nuclear enterprise and 
the ICBM sustainment community.  Next, a review of the current maintenance construct 
for the MM III is explored using Prospect Theory as a means to develop three 
propositions to address the research questions from Chapter I. 
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V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
Chapter Overview 
This final chapter summarizes the findings from this research and their 
applicability to the research questions posed at the beginning of this study.  The role this 
research will play in the future sustainment of the MM III is also explored.  Finally, the 
recommended actions and the potential for future research are summarized to aid those 
following this path in setting up a starting point from which to further this research.   
Conclusions of Research 
Throughout this research the goal was to answer the two research questions posed 
in Chapter I and listed here as a reminder: 
1.  Can MM III sustainment managers leverage RCM methods to provide the 
required level of readiness at an appropriate cost?   
2.  Can existing CBM technologies can be applied to the MM III and GBSD in 
order to effectively sustain the weapon systems?  
From this research, it was found that since the end of the Cold War there has been a shift 
away from a policy of maximum deterrence to one of minimum required deterrence.  
Thus, the drive for increased cost-effectiveness combined with a lack of modernization of 
the MM III maintenance concept has provided an opportunity for innovation to further 
the goal of reducing sustainment costs while maintaining the required level of weapons 
on alert.  
 The current maintenance construct has ensured that a high level of weapons has 
been continually on alert providing constant strategic deterrence for over half a century.  
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However, as the weapon system continues to age and O&M costs continue to rise the 
importance of seeking out cost-effective ways of operating becomes more evident.  As 
such, RCM and CBM methods have been proven in multiple settings, both military and 
civilian, to be able to reduce support costs while also maintaining and even increasing 
system availability.  From this, a set of three propositions were outlined to explore how to 
begin the path from the current state to implementing RCM and CBM. 
Significance of Research 
As noted previously, successful RCM and CBM efforts that have been 
implemented in a multitude of industries have been shown to provide real cost savings 
back to the organization while also increasing efficiency and effectiveness in the 
workplace.  If applied appropriately to the MM III, the expectation would be that these 
savings would also be seen at a significant level.  Additionally, because the GBSD 
program is in the early phases of development, early adoption of RCM and CBM will 
allow sustainment managers to perfect these concepts prior to fielding the new weapon 
system.  This would also likely result in a cost savings because designing the new GBSD 
around existing RCM and CBM infrastructure early in the development and planning 
phases would be easier than attempting to integrate that infrastructure after the GBSD has 
been fielded. 
Recommendations for Action 
From this research, there were three propositions that, if explored, would be able 
to answer the research questions adequately.  The first proposition, that there needs to be 
a merger between reliability and readiness, outlined how taking existing metrics and 
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shifting the goal from maximum deterrence to appropriate readiness would establish the 
framework required for reliability levels required from the weapon system.  The second 
proposition, that a repeatable and proven decision matrix should be implemented to 
categorize which enhanced maintenance concept should be pursued, attempted to link the 
RCM and CBM literature with existing decision models already established for the MM 
III.  The third proposition, that CBM should be investigated in order to sustain high levels 
of reliability, outlined how pursuing CBM technologies now would be able to ensure the 
readiness of the MM III throughout the rest of its life cycle as well as have a robust 
monitoring system in place to identify early failures of newly developed components 
supporting the GBSD program.  Further action in these three areas would provide further 
support to the two research questions that formed the basis of this study. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
In addition to the actions outlined by the three propositions listed above, there are 
areas within the context of this research that would benefit from further research.  One 
area would be to explore the concept of the fourth generation of maintenance and how it 
applies to military systems in general and the ICBM sustainment community in 
particular.  Being on the leading edge of a transition would provide sustainment managers 
with a competitive advantage and could be used as a benchmark for the rest of the DoD’s 
sustainment community.   
Another area that would benefit from further exploration would be to view the 
problem of modernizing the ICBM sustainment community from an organizational 
behavior perspective.  Specifically, this would be through the social theories of change 
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management.  This research could explore what methods would be able to induce a 
culture of innovation under the auspices of nuclear surety and the requirement to have a 
safe, secure, and credible nuclear deterrence force.   
Lastly, one of the limitations listed in Chapter I of this research was that the 
ability for the associated supply chain network to meet a change in maintenance policy 
would not be a part of this research.  However, the link between maintenance and the 
supply chain is one that is imperative to be functioning properly to support efficient 
operations.  Therefore, there would be significant benefit from further research exploring 
how such changes in maintenance policy would affect the associated supply chain 
network. 
Summary 
This final chapter summarizes the findings from this research.  The significance 
of this research towards sustaining the MM III weapon system through the rest of its life 
cycle is illustrated as well as the potential benefits towards sustaining the future GBSD 
program.  It also discusses what actions and future research would be beneficial to further 
build upon the themes explored in this research study.   
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